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NOTES AND COMMENTS

malice. Malice may be shown if the plaintiff can prove that the communication was not made in good faith,35 but that the defendant availed
himself of the privileged occasion wilfully and knowingly for the purpose of defaming the plaintiff,36 or made the communication37in reckless
disregard of the justifiability of the defamatory statements.
It seems rather unfortunate that the North Carolina court, in deciding its first case on this point, should base its opinion on the artificial
holding that there is no publication to the .stenographer because she is
not a third person in her duties as an employee of a corporation, when
the same result could have been more logically reached on the grounds
of a privileged publication. If this latter method had been used, subsequent plaintiffs would be more adequately protected against similar
communications maliciously dictated.
J. B. CHEsHiRE, IV.
Mortgages-Deeds of Trust-Power of Sale-Rights of Mo'rtgagor
Not in Default After Wrongful Sale.
P procured a loan from D land bank, securing the bank by a deed
of trust on her farm. P then made an agreement with W, joined as a
defendant, whereby he became her tenant and agreed to apply a certain
rental each year toward discharging the principal of the obligation and
the interest thereon. P alleges that W failed to apply the rents and
profits properly, and that instead he entered a separate agreement with
the bank whereby he became its tenant; and that after several years,
during which W and D failed properly to apply rental value, and committed waste by selling timber, D declared P in default, and procured
a sale by the trustee. The bank, D, was the purchaser, and later conveyed to H, also joined as a defendant, from whom W subsequently
acquired through purchase. P claims that she was improperly deprived
of her land through the fraud of the defendants, and of others whose
mention is not necessary; she asks for an accounting as to rents, and
profits, for the sale of the land to be set aside as void, for recovery of
the amount of waste and of timber cut, and for a chance to redeem her
land.
P was nonsuited in the lower court, and the Supreme Court sustained this as to all defendants save D. The court was of the opinion that
the evidence in the light most favorable to P showed that D had become
" Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156
(1937) ; Brown v. Elm City Lumber Co., 167 N. C. 9, 82 S. E. 961 (1914) ; Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 110 (1925).
11 Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156
(1937) ; Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 110 (1925).
" Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Beard, 179 Miss. 764, 176 So. 156
(1937).
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mortgagee in possession, and that P was consequently entitled to an
accounting for rents and profits during the period of such relationship.
The court said, further, that if, as P claims, nothing was due D at the
time of the sale, and the latter brought about the sale wrongfully, P
would ordinarily be entitled to redeem the land, unless this has been
rendered impossible by D's conduct, in which eventuality the remedy of
damages is available.' The case raises the question as to what rights a
mortgagor not actually in default has when his land is conveyed to an
innocent purchaser under the power in the instrument, and leaves a
good deal of doubt as to what "conduct" by the mortgagee would render
redemption impossible.
Even in lien states, where the mortgagor and not the mortgagee is
entitled to possession, the latter may obtain the rights of a "mortgagee
in possession". Some states allow him these rights only if he enter with
the express or implied consent of the mortgagor ;2 others extend the
doctrine to peaceable entry in good faith under color of law ;8 a third
group requires only that the possession be peaceably acquired. 4 One
who has become a "mortgagee in possession" may not be divested of this
status until the obligation is satisfied.5 Once the character of mortgagee in possession has been assumed, whether the jurisdiction be title
or lien, he enters into some well settled rights and obligations. He is
chargeable with the rents and profits from such landB which he must
apply as payment on the debt and interest thereon accruing;7 with
waste;8 and with acts amounting to flagrant mismanagement.
He
must keep the premises in such repair as will conserve the property and
prevent ruin and decay, and he must account for losses resulting from
1 Fleming v. North Carolina Joint Stock and Land Bank, 215 N. C. 414, 2 S. E.
(2d) 3 (1939).
'Jones v. Rigby, 41 Minn. 530, 43 N. W. 390 (1899); Herrmann v. Land
Cabinet Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (1916).
3 Cameron v. Ah Quong, 175 Cal. 377, 165 Pac. 961 (1917); Pettit v. Louis,
88 Neb. 496, 129 N. W. 1005 (1911).
'Stouffer v. Harlan, 68 Kan. 135, 74 Pac. 610 (1903) ; Jagar v. Plunkett, 81
Kan. 565, 106 Pac. 280 (1910) ; (1928) 7 TEXc L. REv. 170.
5Cory
v. Santa Ynes Land Co., 151 Cal. 778, 91 Pac. 647 (1907). An exception to the rule occurs when there is gross mismanagement by the mortgagee
in possession. Harding v. Garber, 20 Okla. 11, 93 Pac. 539 (1907) ; 3 JoNEs,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §1931; note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1248. 1253, n. 31.
6Union Bank of Columbia v. Cook, 110 S. C. 99, 96 S. E. 484 (1918) (in
absence of evidence, the rent may be assumed to equal the interest) ; 2 JoNES,
MORTGAGES

§1425.

Peugh v. Davis, 113 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 622, 28 L. ed. 1127 (1885) ; Green
v. Rodman, 150 N. C. 176, 63 S. E. 732 (1909); 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §1437;
WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §§19, 20.
'American Freehold Land Mortgage Co. v. Pollard, 132 Ala. 155, 32 So. 630
(1902) (timber removed); Smith v. Stringer, 228 Ala. 630, 155 So. 85 (1934)
(grapevines destroyed).
9 Baumgard v. Bowman, 31 Ohio App. 266, 167 N. E. 166 (1928) ; see note 5,
supra.
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his failure to discharge such duty. 10 He is credited with reasonably
necessary repairs," but not with what are dearly improvements, unless
these were made under the mistaken belief that he was actually the
owner in fee.' 2 He can usually demand credit for tax payments, 13 for
the paying off of prior liens, 1 4 and for any insurance outlay, 15 unless
this is made solely for his own purposes.le
The right of the mortgagor in the instant case to an accounting from
the mortgagee is therefore clear, since the mortgagee was in possession
because the mortgagor's tenant had become its tenant. If on such an
accounting it turns out that there was nothing due the mortgagee at the
time of the foreclosure, the problem is raised as to the rights of P as
against the bank, D, purchaser at the sale, and W, who eventually acquired the title. This is a phase of the larger question: "What rights and
remedies does a mortgagor have after a foreclosure sale, or sale under
power, which is in some way defective?"
In general, sales under power in a mortgage or deed of trust may be
set aside at the instance of the mortgagor where he suffers injury by
reason of fraud or deceit on the part of the mortgagee or trustee making the sale ;17 where the price received has been so grossly inadequate
as to shock the conscience, if there is also any evidence of collusion,
oppression, or even gross mismanagement by the mortgagee or the trustee :18 or where the mortgagee or trustee becomes purchaser at his own
sale, unless specifically authorized to do so either by the terms of the
10 Dozier v. Mitchell, 65 Ala. 511 (1880); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(3d ed. 1905) §1217; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21; cf. Brown v. South Boston
Savings Bank, 148 Mass. 300, 19 N. E. 382 (1889).
" Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 118 N. W. 174 (1908); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
§1217; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21.
Mickle v. Dillaye, 17 N. Y. 80 (1858); Turk v. Page, 64 Okla. 251, 167
Pac. 462 (1917) ; WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) §21.
13 Hays v. Christiansen, 114 Neb. 764, 209 N. W. 609 (1926).
14 Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 581 (1873) ; Madison Baptist Church v. Oliver Street
Baptist Church, 73 N. Y. 82 (1878).
5 Hays v. Christiansen, 114 Neb. 764, 209 N. W. 609 (1926) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES §1452.
18 Wise v. Layman, 197 Ind. 393, 150 N. E. 368 (1926).
11
The mortgagor can usually proceed against the mortgagee for damages at
law, or have the deed canceled; but if the land goes to an innocent purchaser, the
only recourse is a suit for damages against the offending mortgagee. Warren v.
Susman, 168 N. C. 457, 84 S. E. 760 (1915); Pritchard v. Smith, 160 N. C. 79,
75 S. E. 803 (1912) ; cf. Carr v. Graham, 128 Ga. 622, 57 S. E. 875 (1907) ; Rich
v. Brooks, 179 N. C. 204, 102 S.E. 207 (1920).
18 Sargent v.
Shumaker, 193 Cal. 122, 223 Pac. 464 (1924) ; cf. Holton Park
Co. v. Gary, 133 Md. 509, 105 At. 751 (1919). Mere inadequacy of price, standing alone, cannot upset a duly advertised sale. Gadreault v. Sherman, 250 Mass. 145,
145 N. E. 49 (1924) ; Roberson v. Matthews, 200 N. C. 241, 156 S. E. 496 (1931) ;
Elkes v. Interstate Trustee Corp., 209 N. C. 832, 184 S. E. 826 (1936); note
(1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 172. Also see in this connection N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §2593(b) (statutory provision for enjoining sales at which the price offered
is inadequate).
JURISPRUDENCE
1
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instrument or by statute.1 9 It is widely held that a sale' which fails to
comply with requirements as to notice and advertisement which are
specified in the instrument, or by statute, is void and ineffective to pass
legal title.20 A sale will not usually be set aside on the ground of mere
informality or irregularity not affecting the right to sell or the substantial rights of the parties involved. 21
The instant case raises the question of the effect of a sale when
there has been no default. Here the decisions are somewhat conflicting.
It has been indicated in a few cases that if the mortgage has been paid
before the sale, such sale is voidable, and a purchaser obtains at most a
bare legal title which he holds in trust for the benefit for the mortgagor, or owner of the mortgaged estate,2 2 but this view does not seem
to be very generally followed. A number of states, in which payment
of the debt automatically extinguishes the mortgage securing it and the
power of sale contained therein, have adopted the rule that any sale
made under the power after the debt is paid is void, even as against a
bona fide purchaser. 23 The reason for this rule, as stated in Rogers v.
Barnes,24 a leading case, is that since default of the mortgagor is a condition precedent to the right of sale, this right does not accrue and cannot be exercised until default occurs. According to this case, the
mortgagor may elect whether to recover full damages on account of
the unlawful sale of the land, thus ratifying the title of the innocent
purchaser; or to repudiate the sale and redeem the premises.2
It has

"9There is a presumption of fraud at such sale, although there may be none.
Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N. C. 192, 6 S. E. 766 (1887). The mortgagor can usually
affirm the sale and thus ratify it; or he may avoid it and set it aside. Joyner v.
Farmer, 78 N. C. 196 (1878). But an innocent purchaser for value gets a good
title even from a mortgagee who thus buys. Very v. Russell, 65 N. H. 646, 23
Atl. 522 (1874) ; see Froneberger v. Lewis, 79 N. C. 426, 431 (1878) ; cf. Smith
v. Greensboro Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481 (1938).
2' Cox v. American Freehold & Land Mortgage Co., 88 Miss. 88, 40 So. 739
(1906). Contra: Fountain v. Pateman, 189 Ala. 153, 66 So. 75 (1914); see
Everett v. Woodward, 162 Va. 419, 422, 174 S. E. 864, 867 (1934). A subsequent
purchaser is protected from defects in the proceedings which do not appear of
record, and of which he had no notice, actual or constructive. Fountain v. Pateman, 189 Ala. 153, 66 So. 75 (1914); Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N. C. 727, 155 S. E.
721 (1930) ; see Laramore v. Jones, 157 Ga. 366, 372, 121 S. E. 411, 414 (1924).
WALSH, MORTGAGES

(1934) §85.

Farmers Bank v. Murphree, 200 Ala. 574, 76 So. 932 (1917) ; Flynn v. Curtis
& Pope Lumber Co., 245 Mass. 291, 139 N. E. 533 (1923) ; Jessup v. Nixon, 186
N. C. 100, 118 S. E. 908 (1923) ; Brown v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S. E. 233
(1929)..
(1 See Askew v. Sanders, 84 Ala. 356, '358, 4 So. 167, 168 (1888); Chapin v.
21

Billings, 91 Ill. 539, 544 (1879) ; Fleming v. Barden, 126 N. C. 450, 456, 36 S. E.
17, 19 (1900) ; note (1903) 92 Am. St. Rep. 597.
22 Redmond v. Packenham, 66 Ill. 434 (1872); Crowley v. Adams; 226 Mass.
582, 116 N. E. 241 (1917); Huntington v. Crafton, 76 Tex. 497, 13 S. W. 542
(1890) ; see Wells v. Estes, 154 Mo. 291, 299, 55 S. W; 255, 257 (1900) ; Ferguson
v. Coward, 59 Tenn. 572, 573 (1872).
24 169 Mass. 179, 47 N. E. 602 (1897).
2 The Massachusetts court said further, however, that a parol ratification of
the sale and the deed thereunder would make the purchaser's title secure, and that
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also been indicated that if the innocent purchaser is in possession after
the sale, a court of equity may set the sale aside and compel a reconveyance of the legal title, so as to remove the cloud on the mortgagor's
20
title.
As opposed to this, however, there is the more general rule governing defective sales, which is followed in North Carolina, that a
purchaser without actual or constructive notice of irregularity in the
proceedings, gets a valid title, although the mortgagor might redeem as
against the person making the sale. 27 A subsequent or remote grantee
is not bound to look beyond the recitals of the trustee's deed, and, when
he acts in good faith, he takes a good title as against any defects in the
sale of which he had no actual or constructive knowledge. 28 In accordance with this, it has been held a number of times that where a mortgage containing a power of sale has in fact been discharged, but the
mortgagor has failed to have such release made of record, an innocent
purchaser at a sale made-thereafter will be protected, the mortgagee
being held responsible to the mortgagor for whatever damage he suffers
through this wrongful sale.2 9 In North Carolina, in the leading case of
Burnett v. Dunn Commission and Supply Co.,30 the court held invalid
an attempted exercise of a power of sale after the debt had been satisfied. According to this case, the mortgagor has an election of remedies: he can ratify the sale and accept the proceeds thereof in settlement; he can, by repudiating the sale, sue the trustee or mortgagee for
the wrong done in making such sale and hold him liable for the worth
of the property ;31 or he can mantain an action to set aside the sale,
"assuredly so as against the defendant [mortgagee], and one purchasing with notice".8 2 The implication is that if the land has gone to an
innocent third person, the mortgagor might, perforce, be remitted to his
laches or acts amounting to an estoppel might prevent the mortgagor from contesting the validity of such a title.
" Redmond v. Packenham, 66 Ill. 434 (1872).
17 Shillaber v. Robinson, 97 U. S. 68, 24 L. ed. 967 (1878) ; Hinton v. Hall, 166
N. C. 477, 82 S. E. 847 (1914) ; 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES §2441; WALSH, MORTGAGES
(1934)
§85.
8
"H
inton v. Hall, 166 N. C. 477, 82 S. E. 847 (1914); Brewington v. Hargrove, 179 N. C. 279, 100 S. E. 308 (1919).
"' Garrett v. Crawford, 128 Ga. 519, 57 S. E. 792 (1907); Merchant v. Woods,
27 Minn. 396, 7 N. W. 826 (1881) ; Bausman v. Eads, 46 Minn. 148, 48 N. W. 769
(1891) ; 2 JONES, MORTGAGES §2453 (the measure of damages allowed is usually
the full worth of the property at the time of the sale since that is the amount the
mortgagor has lost through the mortgagee's tort).
O180 N. C. 117, 104 S. E. 137 (1920).
(an allowai Cf. Stansberry v. McDowell, 194 Mo. 194, 186 S. W. 757 (1916)
ance of punitive damages when the mortgagee's tortious foreclosure is intentionally
oppressive and wanton).
"Burnett v. Dunn Commission and Supply Co., 180 N. C. 117, 118, 104 S. E.
137, 138 (1920).
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remedy of damages, as in the cases involving other irregularities in the
sale.
In the principal case (assuming the accounting will show that nothing was owing at the time of foreclosure) the right to exercise the
power of sale had not yet accrued, and hence the sale was unauthorized.
Since D bank, the creditor secured by the deed of trust, purchased at
the sale and could not be considered a purchaser without notice of the
defect, the sale could be avoided as to D. But the bank sold to H, who
sold to W. If H is a purchaser for value without notice, then under
the general rule followed in North Carolina that a subsequent grantee
is not charged with defects in the foreclosure sale of which he had no
notice, P could not avoid the sale and recover the land if IT still held
3 3
it.
Although, in such a situation, as that in the principal case, W
would certainly be no grantee without notice, still if the land goes from
the bona fide purchaser to a subsequent vendee with notice, the latter's
title is unassailable, provided he did not participate in the wrong.3 4 Here
it would by no means be clear that W did not so participate. Therefore, even admitting that a bona fide purchaser would take title under
the defective sale, whether any cause of action existed as against W
would seem to depend on whether H was indeed a bona fide purchaser,
and whether W was a participator in the bank's wrong.
In support of the rule that a purchaser without notice should keep
the land as against the mortgagor, it may be argued that there is little
danger that an innocent mortgagor will suffer any great injustice if he
takes any reasonable precautions in safeguarding his interests. If the
debt has in- fact been paid, the mortgagor may protect himself against
any sale to an innocent purchaser by having this discharge made of
record with the register of deeds in compliance with our North Carolina
recordation statute.3 5 There is small likelihood of any sale being held
without the mortgagor's knowledge in view of the customary notice and
advertisement before sale.36 He has the right to file in the register of
deeds office a lis pendens, which is notice to all subsequent purchasers
of land in such county that they buy subject to the outcome of a suit
which the mortgagor is to bring.3 7 Simpler still, the mortgagor could
appear at the sale and give unmistakable notice that he protests; this
certainly would give any immediate purchaser notice. Since silence or
failure to give any protest at the sale,38 or subsequent ratification and
"3Brown v. Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S.E. 233 (1929) ; Lockridge v. Smith.
206 N. C. 174, 173 S.E. 36 (1934); Davis v. Doggett, 212 N. C. 589, 194 S.E
288 (1937).
' Brown v.Sheets, 197 N. C. 268, 148 S. E. 233, 63 A. L. R. 1362 (1929).
' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2594.
6 Id. §687.
'7Id. §§500-502.
3
" Lewis v. Nunn, 180 N. C. 159, 104 S.E. 470 (1920).
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rental from the purchaser,39 or unreasonable delay such as to constitute
laches, 40 may preclude the mortgagor from getting his equitable relief,
he would do well to assiduously avoid any conduct or inactivity which
might work an estoppel on him in his attempt to have the sale set aside.
This would seem true in some measure of this case. The mortgagor,
so far as appears, made no attempt to warn prospective buyers, and
waited five years after the sale to bring this bill to account and redeem.
On the other band, instances of hardship are quite concei' able in cases
where, through absence, mistake, or ignorance, the mortgagor may not
have actually known of the sale, and hence have given no notice or
indication that the sale was wrongful before an innocent purchaser for
value bought. If, in addition, the mortgagee who has perpetrated the
wrong prove insolvent, under North Carolina law as it has been shown
to be, it would seem that an innocent mortgagor would have no remedy.
Albeit this may work hardships in isolated cases, it is submitted that
from the standpoint of logic as well as of social policy, the North Carolina court is entirely consistent in upholding the rights of an entirely
innocent purchaser without notice, as against those of an innocent
mortgagor who through some inadvertence has failed to make use of
the safeguards afforded him in his character of landowner.
A. H. GRAHAM, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Power to Exercise Previous Restraint
on Freedom of Speech and Assembly.
An ordinance forbade public parades or public assemblage in or
upon the public streets, highways, public parks or public buildings of
Jersey City without a permit from the Director of Public Safety, who
could only refuse a permit for the purpose of preventing a riot, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage. The circuit court of appeals,'
2
modifying and affirming the district court, held the ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that it permitted previous restraint upon the
right of freedom of speech in a public place and forbade peacable assemblage except upon terms repugnant to free speech, contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. On certiorari the United States
3
Supreme Court affirmed this decision, with modifications.
" Flake v. High Point Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 204 N. C. 650, 169 S. E.
223 (1933).
,0Schwartz v. Loftus, 216 Fed. 320 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); see First Nat. Bank
of Opo v. Wise, 235 Ala. 124, 128, 177 So. 636, 639 (1937); Walker v. Schultz,
175 Mich. 280, 292, 141 N. W. 543, 548 (1913).

'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 101 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A.
'Committee for Industrial Organization v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127 (D.N. J.
1938).
'Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, - U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct.
954, 83 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 928 (1939).
3rd. 1939).

